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Injunctions Against Drug Testing Programs
Pending Arbitration:
The Role of Courts and the Right to
Privacy
Susan L. Paulsrudf
In the midst of the growing national concern over substance
abuse, more employers are implementing programs to monitor and
check the use of drugs and alcohol. Employees and their unions
have resisted these programs as restrictions upon employee rights.'
The conflict is particularly intense when employers unilaterally implement testing programs. Unions may then seek to enjoin programs over which they have not bargained and on which arbitrators have not yet ruled. This Comment explores whether courts
may, and under what circumstances they should, enjoin employers
from implementing drug testing programs pending arbitration of
the testing issue.2
Employers' drug testing programs are used in a variety of contexts and are administered in different ways. Still, all drug testing
t B.S. 1986, Butler University; J.D. Candidate 1989, The University of Chicago.
' These rights include, "the right of every worker to privacy, evaluations based on job
performance, presumption of innocence and the right to treatment for illnesses through the
employee assistance programs." Sandra N. Hurd, ed., Employment Testing: A National Reporter on Polygraph, Drug, AIDS, and Genetic Testing D:5 (1987), citing policy on drug
testing adopted by the International Board of the United Auto Workers on September 17,
1986.
' This Comment examines only testing programs initiated by private employers. Myriad constitutional issues, beyond the scope of this comment, arise in the public employment
context. This Comment also will not discuss claims that the employer has engaged in an
unfair labor practice under Section 8(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C.
sec. 158(d) (1982). As a result, only suits by the union to enjoin the employer are considered
here, not decisions by the National Labor Relations Board to request that a court issue an
injunction. This Comment is also limited to suits initiated by unions rather than individual
employees. Non-union cases are not within the ambit of the federal labor laws examined
here, which apply to "labor organizations."
In addition, the this Comment will focus on claims brought in federal court. Generally,
actions by unions to enjoin private employers arise in federal court because state courts are
not subject to Norris-LaGuardia restrictions. Although some states have "little Norris-LaGuardia" acts that permit the bringing of such claims in state court, the arguments advanced in this Comment assume that the suit has been removed to federal court. See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Labor Injunctions, sec. 2.17-2.18 at 82-85 (1986). Finally, the term
"injunction" is used here to include temporary restraining orders.
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cases involve a conflict between the interests of the employer and
those of the union. On the one hand, management seeks increased
productivity and protection from liability to employees or third
parties for worker misconduct caused by drug impairment. Many
employers believe the best way to achieve these goals is by testing
employees for drug use.8 In addition, employers may regard limitations on their ability to test employees as an infringement upon
their freedom to manage the workplace.
Unions, on the other hand, although generally not opposed to
programs that increase workplace productivity and safety,4 are
concerned about intrusions on employees' rights that may result
from testing programs. When employers unilaterally begin drug
testing programs, unions often sue for injunctions pending arbitration.5 More often than not, these suits include claims that the challenged testing programs invade employees' privacy.
Ideally, injunctions in cases involving disputes over arbitrable
issues in general, and over drug testing programs in particular,
should operate to promote and protect the use of the arbitration
mechanism as a means of settling labor disputes. In addition, the
'

See Comment, Meeting the Challenge of Employer Drug Testing to Privacy Rights:

The Right of Nondisclosure, 1988 U. Chi. Legal F. 213.
' Hurd, Employment Testing at D:4 (cited in note 1), citing Robert T. Angarola, Drug
Detection Programs in Industry, 13 PharmChem Newsletter 1, 10 (July-August 1984).
5 Although the circumstances of each testing program vary, there is a typical chain of
events that leads to the union filing suit for an injunction pending arbitration. In general,
the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the employer limits the employer's ability to institute a testing program. The agreement requires that the parties bargain over terms of employment. To that end, the agreement also provides for arbitration of
workplace disputes. Drug testing of employees is a condition of employment and thus a
mandatory subject of bargaining. See, for example, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers v.
Amoco Oil Co., 653 F. Supp. 300, 302 (D.N.D. 1986) (Amoco II) (no dispute as to the arbitrability of the issue of employee drug testing); Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers v. Potomac
Elec., 634 F. Supp. 642, 643 (D.D.C. 1986) (both sides agreed that the testing program was
subject to arbitration); Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers V. Amoco Oil Co., 651 F. Supp. 1,
2 (D. Wyo. 1986) (Amoco I) (parties agreed that dispute as to implementation of testing
program was subject to arbitration). Accordingly, a union expects to bargain over the terms
of a proposed employee testing program. A suit for an injunction against the employer's
program arises whenever the employer unilaterally begins testing prior to the start or conclusion of arbitration over the program.
The employer may unilaterally implement portions of a testing program that are not
covered by the agreement only if it has bargained in good faith to an impasse over the
portions that are mandatory subjects of bargaining. See Intern. Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Ag. v. N.L.R.B., 765 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
' Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, 90 S. Ct. 1583, 1591 (1970); Potomac
Elec., 634 F.Supp. at 643; Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. sec. 185 (1982). Federal courts have
jurisdiction over labor injunction cases under Section 301 of Taft-Hartley, 29 U.S.C.
sec. 185. A union request for injunctive relief in a testing case would not be preempted even
if the union has filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations
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outcomes of these cases should promote the congressional mandate
of a uniform national labor policy.' In reality, however, courts considering claims by unions against employers that institute drug
testing programs have failed to elucidate and follow consistent
standards for granting or denying injunctions, particularly where
invasions of employees' privacy by the challenged programs are alleged. Rather, courts have enjoined some drug testing programs
and permitted strikingly similar plans to continue with no ascertainable reason for distinguishing between cases.
This Comment argues that in order to protect the arbitration
mechanism and promote a uniform national labor policy courts
should assess the harms caused by challenged drug testing programs according to majority principles of privacy derived from
state common law. Part I of this Comment traces the development
of the Boys Markets doctrine, which controls the disposition of
cases involving injunctions against employer breaches of collective
bargaining agreements. Part II examines the role of the courts in
labor disputes. Part III discusses the application of the Boys Markets doctrine to drug testing cases and the inconsistent results
yielded by such application. Part IV proposes that courts, in order
to promote the national labor policy, should use state common law
rights as a guide for determining whether injunctions must issue
against testing programs.
I. THE Boys

MARKETS

DOCTRINE

The United States Supreme Court, in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,8 held that federal courts possess the authority to develop federal common law in labor cases. Although Lincoln Mills
appears to create a large role for courts in labor cases, the tension
between the Norris-La Guardia Act 9 and Section 301 of the TaftHartley Act'0 may create a jurisdictional restraint on this role.
While Norris-LaGuardia prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctions in cases involving labor disputes except in extremely lim-

Board (NLRB). The injunction sought in such a case is only for the period until the arbitrator decides the issue, and thus would not interfere with the NLRB's role in the dispute.
Stove, Furnace& Applied Appliance v. Weyerhauser,650 F. Supp. 431, 433 (S.D. Ill. 1986),
citing Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 302 (1977).
' Boys Markets, 90 S. Ct. at 1590.
8 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
' 29 U.S.C. sec. 101-115 (1982).
'0 29 U.S.C. sec. 185 (1982) (commonly referred to as Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act).
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ited situations," Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act (Taft-Hartley Act) grants federal courts jurisdiction over suits
between employers and unions for breaches of collective bargaining
agreements."'
In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,13 the first in a series of
cases that attempted to resolve this tension, the United States Supreme Court determined that Taft-Hartley ("Section 301") did not
conflict with the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia."
Accordingly, the Court ruled in Sinclair that it could not enjoin
the union from striking in violation of the anti-strike provision in
the collective bargaining agreement. This ruling created many
problems for labor litigation and undermined the arbitration
process."8
The Court in Boys Markets, Inc. v.Retail Clerk's Union' reconsidered the injunction issue and overruled the decision in Sinclair, adopting the view of the Sinclair dissent. 7 Suggesting that
the holding of Sinclairundermined courts' ability to effectively enforce agreements to arbitrate, 8 the Court in Boys Markets carved
out a narrow exception to the anti-injunction provisions of NorrisLaGuardia. The Court held that, under certain circumstances, injunctive relief could be granted by courts in cases involving strikes
Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides that "[n]o court of the United States
shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction
in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute ...." 29 U.S.C. sec. 104 (1982).
11Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) provides in
pertinent part: "Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry ... may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties .... 29 U.S.C. sec. 185(a) (1982).
370 U.S. 195 (1962).
"

Id. at 213.

Sinclair effectively stripped not only federal but also state courts of jurisdiction over
suits to enjoin alleged violations of collective bargaining agreements. Because state courts
were not subject to the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia, any party that
wanted to avoid an injunction against it could invoke Section 301 and remove the dispute to
a federal court that was subject to the anti-injunction restrictions. For a more complete
discussion of the effect of Norris-LaGuardia and Section 301 on the state courts' role see,
James B. Atleson, The Circle of Boys Markets: A Comment on Judicial Inventiveness, 7
Indus. Rel. L. J. 88 (1985).
More importantly, Sinclair jeopardized the government's ability to carry out its proarbitration policy. A union's no-strike obligation is the quid pro quo for an employer's
agreement to submit grievances to the arbitration mechanism. If a union could not be forced
to adhere to its contractual promise not to strike, then there was no incentive for an employer to agree to arbitrate labor issues. Boys Markets, 90 S.Ct. at 1591 (cited in note 6).
'

Is Id.
17 Id. at 1592.

18Id. at 1591 (concluding that Sinclair did "not make a viable contribution to [the]
federal labor policy" of promoting and protecting the arbitration process).
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over arbitrable grievances. 19 According to the Boys Markets exception to the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia, a court
considering a request for injunctive relief must base its determination on: (1) The probability of success on the merits; (2) the arbitrability of the dispute; (3) whether the violation at issue is ongoing; (4) the presence of irreparable harm; (5) the balance of
hardships to the parties.2" Although the irreparable harm criterion
generally determines the outcome of the suit, each factor must be
considered in turn.
Probability of success on the merits. In cases involving requests by unions for injunctive relief, courts most often have reduced "probability of success on the merits" to a showing that arbitration is not a futile endeavor or that the suit is not based on a
frivolous claim.21 In other words, this prong of the Boys Markets
standard amounts in practice to an extremely low threshold requirement 22 and limits the courts' examination to a cursory glance
at the face of the collective bargaining agreement.2 3
Arbitrability. The second prong of the Boys Markets exception to the proscriptions of Norris-LaGuardia requires that the disputed issue be subject to arbitration.24 In AT & T Tech., Inc. v.
"
20

Id. at 1594.

Id.

See, for example, Nursing Home & Hospital Union v. Sky-Vue Terrace, 759 F.2d
1094, 1098 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1985); InternationalChemical Wkrs v. Olin, No. 87 C 5745, slip op.
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 1987); Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers v. Metropolitan Edison, No. 864426, slip op. (E.D. Penn. Aug. 14, 1986) (citing Sky Vue Terrace, Inc., 759 F.2d at 1098 n.
3).
2 See, for example, Weyerhaeuser, 650 F. Supp. at 433 (cited in note 6) (in which the
court stated that "[tlhe standard for such a showing is low ....
It is enough that Union's
chances are better than negligible"); Potomac Elec., 634 F. Supp. at 643 (cited in note 5)
(where the court merely made mention of the "usual equitable concerns" and focused entirely on the irreparable harm requirement). A few courts have applied a more exacting
standard of probability of success on the merits. In Amoco II, 653 F. Supp. at 303 (cited in
note 5), the court required a showing by the union that not only would it prevail in arbitration, but that the dispute would be resolved fully in the arbitration. Because the court was
unpersuaded that a win on the merits would result in a resolution of the dispute, it considered the union's showing to be insufficient. Id. See also Int. Union, U. Auto, Aero. v. Lester
Eng'ing, 575 F. Supp. 797, 800 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (requiring a showing of "strong likelihood
of success" on the merits); Hoh v. Pepsico, Inc., 491 F.2d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding
that the union must show both likelihood of compelling arbitration and likelihood of obtaining the requested award).
2 For example, if the bargaining agreement at issue stated explicitly that the employer
had a right to use any means to test employees for drug abuse, the court would rule against
the union on the probability of success on the merits and, accordingly, deny the injunction.
In contrast, if the agreement contained nothing more than a vague management-rights
clause, then the court would rule in favor of the union because nothing in the agreement
expressly negated the union's claim.
24 Boys Markets, 90 S. Ct. at 1594 (cited in note 6).
2

266

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1988:

Communications Workers,25 the Supreme Court elucidated three
principles to guide courts in identifying arbitrable disputes. 26 First,
courts must respect the intent of the parties to the collective bargaining agreement; thus, "a party cannot be required to submit to
'27
arbitration a dispute . . . which it has not agreed to so submit.
Second, courts are required to determine arbitrability without ruling on the merits of the underlying claim. 28 Finally, given agreements which contain general arbitration clauses,29 courts should
presume that the grievance is arbitrable." In light of this strong
presumption in favor of arbitrating disputes and the national policy of promoting the arbitration process, this prong of the Boys
Markets standard rarely affects a union's effort to obtain an injunction against its employer.3 1
Ongoing violation. The third element of the Boys Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia prohibition against injunctions is
that the alleged breaches of the bargaining agreement are "occurring and will continue, or have been threatened and will be committed."32 In effect, this is a mootness requirement, as a satisfactory showing by the union merely establishes that there is indeed a
violation for the arbitrator to remedy.33 This factor requires so little inquiry by the courts that many do not even state the require26

106 S. Ct. 1415 (1986).

16 The Court in AT & T emphasized that, unless the parties to the collective bargaining
agreement clearly expressed a contrary intent, the question of arbitrability was unmistakably one for the court and not for the arbitrator. Id. at 1418.
27 Id. at 1418, citing Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 573, 582 (1960).
28 Id. at 1419. This directive is consistent with the role of the courts under the
"probability of success on the merits" requirement of the Boys Markets standard.
29 Standard collective bargaining agreements contain clauses which provide for arbitration or for grievance procedures that culminate in arbitration of all terms of employment.
See Bernard D. Meltzer, Labor Law 921 (3d ed. 1985).
'o AT & T, 106 S. Ct. at 1415 (cited in note 25). The Court explained that in these
circumstances only an "express exclusion" of the issue from arbitration or "other forceful
evidence" of a purpose to exclude bars arbitration of a grievance. Id. This presumption of
arbitrability recognizes the "greater institutional competence of arbitrators in interpreting
collective bargaining agreements" and "furthers the national labor policy of peaceful resolution of labor disputes" through the arbitration process. Id.
"2 See cases cited in notes 44-46.
2 Boys Markets, 90 S. Ct. at 1594 (cited in note 6).
11 In other words, if the employer had agreed not to commence testing until after the
conclusion of arbitration, then the court would dismiss the suit. Conceivably an employer
that had started testing could stop if it appeared that the union would prevail in the suit for
an injunction or in subsequent arbitration. The union's recourse under these circumstances
would be to initiate a grievance procedure with respect to any damages to employees that
occurred while the employer was testing.
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ment.3 4 Ongoing violation, like probability of success, is an element
that requires only a cursory glance by the court.
Irreparableharm. The success of every claim for an injunction
against an employer's violation of a collective bargaining agreement hinges on the union's showing that its members will suffer
irreparable harm if the employer's actions are allowed to continue. 5 Under the irreparable harm criterion, courts examine
whether, absent the issuance of an injunction, the injury to employees is so great that it renders the arbitrator's potential award a

"nullity" or "hollow formality." 3 An arbitrator's award is consid-

ered a nullity if it cannot possibly compensate employees for the
injury that occurs between the start of the employer's activity and
the arbitrator's decision.37 In such instances, the court, by issuing
an injunction, shields unions from harms that are beyond repair by
the arbitrator. 8
Balance of hardship.Once the union establishes that its members will sustain irreparable harm, the court balances the hardships to the employer and the public imposed by the court's putting a stop to employer's activity against the injury to the union
that stems from the continuation of the disputed activity. 9 The
See, for example, Local Lodge No. 1266 v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276 (7th Cir.
1981); Lester Eng'ing, 575 F.Supp. 797 (cited in note 22); Weyerhaeuser, 650 F. Supp. 431
(cited in note 6); Potomac Elec., 634 F. Supp. 642 (cited in note 5).
" Aluminum Workers Intern. v. Consol. Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437, 443 (6th Cir.
1982) ("[TIhe irreparability of the injury suffered by the union has in many cases become
virtually the sole inquiry in those cases where injunctive relief is sought against an employer" (cites omitted)).
" Consol. Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d at 443. See also Columbia Local, Am. Postal
Workers Un. v. Bolger, 621 F.2d 615, 618 (4th Cir. 1980) (injury is so great as to render the
arbitral process a "hollow formality"); Amoco Oil 11, 653 F. Supp. at 303 (cited in note 5)
(the harm "renders the arbitration process a nullity").
"7Possible post-arbitration harms are considered by the arbitrator. For a general discussion of the arbitration process, see Meltzer, Labor Law at 921-25 (cited in note 29). Furthermore, during the determination of irreparable harm, only harms to the moving party,
the union in this case, are examined. Harms to the employer or the public caused by delay
in the implementation of the employer's disputed program are balanced against injury to
the union once irreparable harm is proved. See, for example, Amoco I, 651 F. Supp. at 4
(cited in note 5); Weyerhaeuser, 650 F. Supp. at 433 (cited in note 6); Amoco 11, 653 F.
Supp. at 303 (cited in note 5).
" Issuance of an injunction by the court in such circumstances is proper. See Owen M.
Fiss, Injunctions 59 (2d ed. 1984) ("The injunction is an equitable remedy . . . [and] is
available only after the applicant shows that the legal remedies are inadequate").
" See Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, 749 F.2d 380, 388 (7th Cir. 1984)
("Sometimes an order granting or denying a preliminary injunction will have consequences
beyond the immediate parties. If so, these interests-the 'public interest' if you will-must
be reckoned into the weighing process .... ").Because the balance of hardships is only
considered once the union establishes irreparable harm, only courts granting injunctions are
required to reach the issue.
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union must show that the balance favors the issuance of an
injunction. 0
Once the union makes a showing of irreparable harm, it is
quite difficult for the employer to demonstrate that the harm it
suffers due to delay in implementing the disputed program or the
cessation of the challenged activity exceeds the harm to the
union."' Even showings that third parties or the public interest
would be harmed by the injunction often fail to outweigh the
union's alleged injury. Only in cases where there is an extreme
concern for public safety, as with labor disputes at a nuclear facility, does the balance of harms tend to favor the employer."3
II.

THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN LABOR DISPUTES

The integrity of the arbitration process depends in part on the
courts assuming a restricted role in the resolution of labor disputes. There are at least three ways in which confining the courts'
role promotes and protects the arbitration process. First, courts'
limited involvement in labor disputes furthers the national labor
policy favoring peaceful settlement of labor disputes through the
arbitration process, not the courts."" Accordingly, courts, in deference to the role of the arbitrator, should not and do not rule on the
" Boys Markets, 90 S.

Ct. at 1594 (cited in note 6).

41 In Panoramic,for example, the court highlighted the difficulty of overcoming a show-

ing by the union of irreparable harm: "[R]elative hardships may favor issuance of an injunction even when the employer is compelled to maintain what may be a less efficient or more
costly operation." 668 F.2d at 289 (cited in note 34). See also Weyerhaeuser, 650 F. Supp. at
433 (cited in note 6) (employer's safety rationale for implementing drug policy could not
defeat union's showing of irreparable harm).
4, In Truck Drivers, Oil Drivers, Etc. v. Almarc Mfg., 553 F. Supp. 1170, 1174 (N.D. Ill.
1982), the court made clear that "it is a rare case in which granting of a preliminary injunction will disserve the public interest."
'3 For example, in Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Neb.
1987), the court, persuaded by the public safety argument, allowed drug testing at a nuclear
facility to continue. Rushton is distinguishable, however, because the employer Was considered to be a state actor. In the private employer context, such safety concerns may influence
the balancing of harms to a lesser extent. In Metropolitan Edison, No. 86-4426, slip. op.
(cited in note 21), the court issued an injunction against drug testing of employees at a
nuclear facility, finding that public interest in the safe operation of the facility did not outweigh employees' rights to privacy. It is worth noting, however, that, prior to the dispute,
the employer had extensive safety precautions in place which guarded against drug or alcohol related accidents and which were unaffected by the injunction.
" Boys Markets, 90 S. Ct. at 1594 (cited in note 6) ("[C]ongressional policy favor[sI the
voluntary establishment of a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of labor disputes");
Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. at 578 (cited in note 27) ("[t]he present federal policy is to
promote industrial stabilization through the collective bargaining agreement .... A major
factor in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement").
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merits of the case.4 5 Second, parties to a collective bargaining
agreement place the arbitrator, not the courts, at the center of the
dispute resolution process."" If courts were to inextricably involve
themselves in adjudicating the merits of claims for violations of
collective bargaining agreements, the intent of the contracting parties would be frustrated.47 Third, by limiting their involvement in
the resolution of disputes, courts properly reserve the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements to the expertise of the
arbitrator.8
The Boys Market doctrine restricts judicial involvement in
cases involving injunctions against employers to enforcing promises
to arbitrate,' 9 thereby protecting the arbitration process.5 0 The
court in Boys Market clearly limited the use of injunctions to those
instances in which the arbitration mechanism agreed to by the parties was imperiled by the employer's activity. 1 The five criteria set
forth in Boys Markets" operate to prevent the automatic issuance
of injunctions"3 and simultaneously protect employees from em-

4' Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 ("The federal policy of settling
labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits
of the awards"). For a discussion of the arbitrator's role see Meltzer, Labor Law at 924-25
(cited in note 29), and sources cited therein. See also David E. Feller, The Remedy Power in
Grievance Arbitration, 5 Indust. Rel. L.J. 128 (1982).
" Once parties have agreed that arbitration is the desired mechanism for settling grievance disputes arising over the interpretation or application of a collective bargaining agreement, the federal labor policy can be "effectuated only if the means chosen by the parties
...
is given full play." Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960).
4' "The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all
questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator." Id. at 567-68.
" The Court in Enterprise Corp. described the special ability of the arbitrator to understand the circumstances of the dispute and the effect of its resolution: "[Airbitrators
under . . . collective agreements are indispensable agencies in a continuous collective bargaining process. They sit to settle disputes at the plant level-disputes that require for their
solution knowledge of the custom and practices of a particular factory or of a particular
industry as reflected in the particular agreements." 363 U.S. at 596 (cited in note 45).
" Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 411 (1976).
50 Id. at 407. "The driving force behind Boys Markets was to implement the strong
congressional preference for the private dispute settlement mechanisms agreed upon by the
parties."
" The Court explicitly stated that its holding was "a narrow one," and that it did not
want to "undermine the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act" by overextending the injunctive powers of the federal courts. Boys Markets, 90 S. Ct. at 1591 (cited in note 6).
"' As discussed earlier, these are: Probability of success on the merits, arbitrability of
the dispute, ongoing dispute, irreparable harm and balance of hardships. Id. at 1594.
53 A practice of issuing injunctions following any unilateral action that is arguably arbitrable would create a powerful incentive for both parties not to include an arbitration clause
in the collective bargaining agreement. Such a result clearly is contrary to the mandate of
the Steelworkers trilogy: American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 566 (cited in note 46); Warrior & Gulf,
363 U.S. at 578 (cited in note 27); Enterprise Corp., 363 U.S. at 596 (cited in note 46).
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ployer abuses of collective bargaining agreements.
Boys Markets illustrates precisely how the limited use of injunctions promotes the integrity of the arbitration process. In that
case, an injunction was granted against a union which was striking
in violation of its no-strike obligation in the collective bargaining
agreement. 54 The injunction, by forbidding the union to maintain
its strike, encouraged the parties to the collective bargaining agreement to adhere to the arbitration provision. 5 In addition, it reinforced the parties' confidence in the efficacy of the arbitration
mechanism as a means of settling disputes over conditions in their
workplace. 6 Absent reassurance that the union could be compelled
to abide by its contractual obligations, the employer would have
5 7
been wary of assuming any obligation to arbitrate disputes.
The directive in Boys Markets that courts considering injunctions in arbitrable disputes may not reach the merits of the claims
also preserves the integrity of the arbitral process. Parties to an
agreement contract for the arbitrator's review of the grievance;58
an adjudication on the merits of the claim by a court would clearly
frustrate the intent of the parties. Moreover, the impartiality and
authority of the arbitrator would be undermined by a court's ruling on the contract claim.

III.

THE APPLICATION OF

Boys MARKETS TO TESTING CASES

Boys Markets involved a suit by an employer to enjoin a union
from striking, but the Boys Markets five-step approach to injunctions pending arbitration of disputes also applies to cases concerning suits by unions to enjoin employers. Most courts have adopted
the view that, provided the five Boys Markets criteria are met, injunctions can issue against employer breaches of collective bargaining agreements.5 9
Boys Markets, 90 S. Ct. at 1594 (cited in note 6). Although Boys Markets involved
an injunction against a union, rather than an injunction against an employer as is at issue
here, the Boys Markets doctrine applies equally to both situations. See Metropolitan
Edison, No. 86-4426, slip op. (cited in note 21) (stating that "it is now well-established that
federal courts have jurisdiction to enjoin employer actions as well as employee actions"),
citing Sky Vue Terrace, 759 F.2d 1094 (cited in note 21).
11 Allowing the strike to continue, by contrast, would "interfere with and frustrate the
arbitral process by which the parties had chosen to settle a dispute." Id.
' Boys Markets, 90 S. Ct. at 1593 (cited in note 6).
57

Id.

"8Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 411 (cited in note 49) ("[The parties] have not contracted
for a judicial preview of the facts and the law"); Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 599 (cited in note
45) ("It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for").
" See, for example, Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 282-83 (cited in note 34); Bolger, 621 F.2d
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A minority of courts has adopted alternative approaches to
cases involving injunctions against employers. According to one
view, the proscriptions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act apply only to
injunctions against unions; in other words, the Act does not restrict
the way in which courts issue injunctions against employers.6 This
view is premised on the Act's original purpose of protecting employees from the "abuses that ... resulted from the interjection of
the federal judiciary into union-management disputes on behalf of
management."6 1 This view, however, fails to take into consideration that the Taft-Hartley Act was intended to de-emphasize the
protection of labor and eliminate pro-union bias which dominated
the settlement of disputes following the enactment of Norris-LaGuardia.6 2 Finally, a few courts have taken the position that the
Boys Markets exception to Norris-LaGuardia does not apply to
employers absent a provision in the agreement that the employer
will maintain the status quo.6
The Supreme Court has implicitly approved of the majority
view that the Boys Markets rule is essentially a "two-sided coin"
and thus applies to injunctions against employers and unions
alike." The language of Norris-LaGuardia suggests that its anti-

at 617 (cited in note 36); Sky Vue Terrace, 759 F.2d at 1098 (cited in note 21); Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Etc. v. Branch Motor Exp., 463 F. Supp. 282, 288 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Communications Workers of America v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 430 F. Supp. 969, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
60 See, for example, United Auto Workers v. White Farm Equipment, 119 L.R.R.M.
2878, 2881 (D. Minn. 1984).
",Boys Markets, 90 S. Ct. at 1592 (cited in note 6).
" Comment, Labor Law-Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers: The End of the
Erosion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 55 N.C.L. Rev. 1247, 1253 (1977).
03 See Amalgamated Transit U., Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines,
550 F.2d 1237, 1238-39
(9th Cir. 1977); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Ft. Pitt Steel Casting, 598 F.2d 1273, 1279
(3d Cir. 1979); Texaco Independent U., Etc. v. Texaco, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 1097, 1103 (W.D.
Pa. 1978).
"4 "The Supreme Court, by requiring Buffalo Forge analysis in suits against employers,
seems also to accept at least partial application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to such suits."
Perritt, Labor Injunctions at 174 n. 35 (cited in note 2), citing Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.
Transit Union Div. 1384, 429 U.S. 807 (1976) (reversing and remanding injunction against
employer for reconsideration in light of Buffalo Forge), on remand, 550 F.2d 1237. Buffalo
Forge has been interpreted as "stat[ing] a jurisdictional rule: In the absence of a dispute
over an arbitrable issue, a district court lacks jurisdiction to give injunctive relief against a
purported breach of a no-strike agreement." Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Etc. v. Branch Motor,
463 F. Supp. at 288 (cited in note 59), quoting Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers,
545 F.2d 1336, 1342 (3d Cir. 1976). On remand, the Ninth Circuit in Greyhound emphasized
that, in light of Buffalo Forge, the Boys Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
applies only if the dispute is covered by the collective bargaining agreement. Greyhound,
550 F.2d at 1238. In other words, provided that a court considering a claim for a preliminary
injunction against a party to a collective bargaining agreement finds that the dispute is
arbitrable, a Boys Markets injunction can issue against either a union or an employer.
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injunction provisions, which were subsequently modified by the
Taft-Hartley Act, reach unions as well as employers. 5 Furthermore, injunctions against employers are not inconsistent with the
policies expressed in the legislative histories of the Norris-LaGuardia and Taft-Hartley Acts. While the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
designed to protect labor unions from the pro-employer bias created by the use of labor injunctions,6 6 the Taft-Hartley Act signalled a "shift in Congressional emphasis away from the protection
of labor to the ... protection of contractual rights of both parties
to a collective bargaining agreement. ' 67 Thus, although the Taft"

Section 101 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides that "[n]o court of the United

States ... shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent
injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in strict conformity
with the provisions of this chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared in this chapter." 29
U.S.C sec. 101 (1982) (emphasis added). Thus, the sole requirement of Section 101 is that a
labor dispute exist. A "labor dispute" is defined in Section 113 of the Act as "any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment .... " 29 U.S.C. sec. 113(c)(1982). Because a testing
program is a "term or condition of employment", a dispute over the implementation of such
a program constitutes a "labor dispute" for purposes of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Hurd,
Employment Testing at D:16 (cited in note 1).
00 The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 (cited in note 9); Meltzer, Labor Law at 27-28
(cited in note 29).
Comment, 55 N.C.L. Rev. at 1253 (cited in note 62). Despite the Norris-LaGuardia
Act's clear bias towards the protection of labor unions, its legislative history indicates that
the anti-injunction provisions of the Act were intended to benefit employers as well as unions. The Senate Report on Norris-LaGuardia noted that the prohibitions against injunctions applied "to organizations of labor and organizations of capital" and that the Act's
other provisions generally applied "both to employers and employees." To Define and Limit
the Jurisdiction of Courts Sitting Equity, S. Rep. No. 163, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1932).
See also, George Schatzki, Some Observations About the Standards Applied to Labor Injunction Litigation Under Sections 10(j) and 10(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 59
Ind. L.J. 565 (1984); Perritt, Labor Injunctions at 171 (cited in note 2). Following the passage of Norris-LaGuardia in 1932, as labor organizations grew in strength, the balance in
bargaining power between employers and unions shifted; accordingly, congressional emphasis shifted from "protection of the nascent labor movement to the encouragement of collective bargaining." Boys Markets, 90 S. Ct. at 1593 (cited in note 6). In order to promote the
peaceful resolution of labor disputes, it became increasingly important to simultaneously
curb abuses by labor unions of their Norris-LaGuardia protections and encourage employers
to submit to bargaining agreements. This shift in congressional emphasis was expressed in
the Senate Report on legislation ultimately adopted in the Taft-Hartley Act:
[Tihe Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 [was] enacted at the time when millions of
persons were unemployed and labor organizations were relatively weak and ineffective ....

The need for ...

legislation is urgent. Supreme Court interpretations

of the Norris-LaGuardia Act ... seem to have placed union activities, no matter
how destructive to the rights of the individual workers and employers who are
conforming to the National Labor Relations Act, beyond the pale of Federal
Law."
Federal Labor Relations Act of 1947, Sen. Rep. No. 105 on S.1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
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Hartley Act did not overrule Norris-LaGuardia," the former requires a reading of Norris-LaGuardia which extends its protections
to cover both employers and unions.
Whether a Boys Markets injunction will issue against either a
union or an employer which has violated a collective bargaining
agreement generally depends on a finding of irreperable harm. 9 In
cases involving union challenges to drug testing programs, three
types of harms to the employees usually are claimed: (1) Loss of
employment as a result of a positive drug test result; (2) stigma or
injury to reputation caused by circulation of test results, and; (3)
invasion of employees' privacy by the act of testing. 0
There is general agreement among the courts that loss of employment can be remedied by the arbitrator through awards of
backpay and reinstatement.7 1 Accordingly, in most circumstances,7 union claims that drug testing programs irreparably

(1947), published in NLRB, 1 Legislative History of the LMRA, 1947 at 407-08 (1948).
68 Abner J. Mikva, The Changing Role of the Wagner Act in the American Labor
Movement, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1123, 1127 (1986).
09 See Section I of this Comment for a discussion of the significance of the irreparable
harm requirement of the Boys Markets rule.
,0See, for example, Amoco I, 651 F. Supp. at 5 (cited in note 5); Amoco 11, 653 F.
Supp. at 303 (cited in note 5); Weyerhaeuser, 650 F. Supp. at 431 (cited in note 6); Metropolitan Edison, slip op. (cited in note 21); Olin, slip op. (cited in note 21); Potomac Elec.,
634 F. Supp. at 644 (cited in note 5).
" In Potomac Elec. the court stated the prevailing view that "loss of employment of
union members, and the concomitant inconveniences and hardships, alone do not 'represent
the type of harm that, by its occurrence, threatens the integrity of the arbitral process ....
[Tihe arbitrator can award backpay and order reinstatement." 634 F. Supp. at 644 (cites
omitted). See also Weyerhaeuser, 650 F. Supp. at 432 (in which the union conceded that it
had an adequate remedy through arbitration in the event that one of its union members was
fired after testing); Amoco 11, 653 F. Supp. at 303 (where the court noted that aggrieved
employees could be made whole by an arbitrator's award of lost income and reinstatement).
Even the consequential damages of unemployment may not provide a basis for the issuance
of an injunction. The court in Lodge 802, Intern. Broth., Etc. v. Sun Ship, Inc., 511 F.
Supp. 347 (E.D. Pa. 1981), offered compelling reasons for not considering loss of employment as irreparable harm: "In every instance where a worker is laid off there is certain to be
... [negative] impact, and for the courts to categorize it as irreparable harm would justify
issuance of an injunction whenever the union could establish that a lay-off or dismissal was
arbitrable." Id. at 350 (emphasis in original). A few courts, however, have held that the
consequential damages of unemployment do constitute irreparable harm. See, for example,
Technical, Office & Pro. Wkrs. U., Loc. 757, Etc. v. Budd Co., 345 F. Supp. 42, 46 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (disruption in workers' personal lives caused by improper layoff amounted to irreparable harm); Almarc Mfg., 553 F. Supp. at 1173-74 (cited in note 42) (unemployment which
results in "mortgage foreclosure as well as serious difficulties in sustaining the needs of
everyday life" considered beyond arbitrator's ability to remedy).
" Unemployment has been deemed irreparable in a few cases not involving drug testing
where the employer was ready to be dissolved or relocated. In such situations, it would be
impossible for the arbitrator to force reinstatement after the business was shut down or
moved. See Panoramic,668 F. 2d at 286 (cited in note 34) (sale of business); Drivers, Chauf-
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harm employees by leading to suspensions or job loss inevitably
fail before a court considering an injunction against the employer.
The second type of harm often alleged in drug testing cases is
the stigma that attaches to employees who test positively for drugs
and are subsequently subjected to disciplinary action . 7 More often
than not, courts have found these consequences of employee drug
testing insufficient to sustain a claim for an injunction.7 4 At least
one court has concluded that stigma caused by unfavorable test
results was not irreparable at all, as it could be remedied with
compensation for lost income and, in cases where an employee was
5
fired, with reinstatement.
Although stigma and loss of employment are harms that are
almost uniformly deemed insufficient to sustain an injunction
against a testing program, it is unclear under what circumstances
injury to employees' right to privacy will justify enjoining employee testing. Because courts have exercised discretion in defining
the scope of an employee's right to privacy and the extent of the
intrusion caused by testing programs, the drug testing cases have
yielded conflicting and seemingly arbitrary results.
Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers v. Potomac Elec.76 illustrates
the arbitrary treatment of the privacy right in testing cases. In Potomac Elec. the district court originally issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting the employer from replacing its old
drug testing policy with one that imposed swifter penalties for pos-

feurs, Etc. v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 582 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1978) (liquidation of business); Lever Bros. Co. v. Intern. Chemical Wkrs. Union, Etc., 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1976)
(relocation of plant).
" See Potomac Elec., 634 F. Supp. at 644 (cited in note 5) (alleging that employer drug
testing policy caused humiliation and stigma due to drug-related disciplinary action); Olin,
slip op. (cited in note 21) (claim that employees subject to stigma of being labelled a drug
user if urine tests yielded false positives).
74 See Id. (stigma insufficient to enjoin implementation of drug abuse policy); Amoco II,
653 F. Supp. at 303 (cited in note 5) (stigma not sufficient to impose injunctive relief); Sun
Ship, 511 F. Supp. at 350-51 (cited in note 71) (anxiety caused by lay-off insufficient to
warrant injunctive relief). Two courts considering injunctions against employers' drug testing programs concluded that stigma constituted irreparable harm which could be remedied
only with an injunction. In Metropolitan Edison, slip op. at 6 (cited in note 21), the court
recognized irreparable harm in the form of humiliation and damage to reputation caused by
drug testing program. The finding of irreparable humiliation, however, may have been influenced by the fact that the testing program at issue was administered on a random basis.
The court in Weyerhaeuser, agreed with the union's contention that a "black mark" on an
employment record was irreparable. 650 F. Supp. at 432 (cited in note 6). The nature of the
disputed testing program not apparent from the court's discussion.
7 Amoco I, 651 F. Supp. at 5 (cited in note 5).
76 634 F. Supp. 642 (cited in note 5).
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itive test results. 77 The court harshly criticized the remedial provisions of the program and ruled that its implementation would
clearly invade employees' privacy. 78 Following an evidentiary hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction, a different judge on
the same court denied the preliminary injunction, finding that the
testing program did not violate employee rights to privacy.79 Both
judges considered the same testing program; 0 yet, each had different notions of the scope of the employees' privacy rights.8
Other drug testing cases reveal similar inconsistencies. In
Weyerhaeuser, the court, without discussing the nature of the
challenged drug testing program, concluded that the testing program constituted an invasion of privacy that caused irreparable injury to employees. 2 The court in MetropolitanEdison reached the
same conclusion regarding a program that featured testing for
cause and during annual check-ups.8 3 But in Olin, a drug testing
program administered, in part, on a random basis was found not to
impinge on rights to privacy.8 4 In Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers
v. Amoco Oil Co. (Amoco I), the court ruled that employees' rights
of privacy were not violated by testing conducted for cause and
during mandatory annual physicals. 85 The court also determined
that even if the testing invaded employee privacy, the grievance
procedures in the collective bargaining agreement provided adequate remedies. 6
77 IBEW Local 1900 v. PEPCO, 121 L.R.R.M. 3071, 3073 (D.D.C. 1986).
78

The court in PEPCO characterized the challenged testing program as a "drastic mea-

sure" causing "invasions of privacy ... almost unheard of in free society." Id. at 3072.
79 Potomac Elec., 634 F. Supp. at 642 (cited in note 5).
80 Although the defendant employer did modify several features of its drug testing program between the issuance of the temporary restraining order and the hearing for the preliminary injunction, the provisions to which the union most strenuously objected remained
in the latter version. The union opposed two provisions in the former program which allowed for random testing and testing without cause. Id. at 643. The company agreed in the
preliminary injunction hearing to abide by certain conditions in implementing the new program prior to completion of arbitration. The employer did not, however, modify the provisions for random testing. Id. at 644. Thus, the disparate holdings cannot be distinguished
based on the circumstances of the testing.
8' In denying the preliminary injunction, the judge failed to reconcile his decision with
that of his colleagues. There is possibly a distinction between a temporary restraining order,
which is only in effect for a few days, and an injunction pending arbitration, but the injunction court did not rely on this difference.
8' Weyerhaeuser, 650 F. Supp. at 433 (cited in note 6). The court did not explain the
basis for its determination that employee privacy rights were being invaded by the drug
testing program.
11 Metropolitan Edison, slip op. (cited in note 21).
84 Olin, slip op. (cited in note 21).
81 Amoco I, 651 F. Supp. at 5 (cited in note 5).
86 Id. The Weyerhaeuser court, in contrast, did not consider the protection afforded
employees by the grievance procedure.
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The above cases suggest that, to date, determinations regarding the extent to which drug testing programs infringe upon employees' rights to privacy depend less on the nature of the testing
program, and more on courts' vague notions of the privacy rights.
The inconsistent judicial treatment of injunctions against employers that initiate testing programs undermines the congressional
policy favoring a uniform system of labor law.8 7 In addition, the
inconsistency in the case law regarding employee drug testing creates an "unacceptably risky gamble for employers who should test
and an unproven and unreliable shield for employees who deserve
better protection from unwarranted testing.""8
IV. A

PROPOSED APPROACH TO DRUG TESTING CASES

In Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court held that "the substantive law to apply in suits under Section 301(a) 9 is federal law,
which the courts must fashion from our policy of national labor
laws." 90 Federal constitutional provisions generally are not relevant
in the private employer context, ' and no federal legislation expressly proscribes or regulates the testing of employees for sub87 Boys

Markets, 90 S. Ct. at 1590 (cited in note 6). The Court in this case discussed a
"federal policy of labor law uniformity" with reference to the variance in remedies caused
by disparate state laws. Id. However, a disparity in remedies awarded by courts that apply
federal law similarly undermines the policy of labor law uniformity. By simultaneously
granting and denying injunctions in cases involving indistinguishable testing programs,
courts may "greatly frustrate any relative uniformity in the enforcement of arbitration
agreements." Id.
88 Note, Employee Drug Testing: Redrawing the Battlelines in the War on Drugs, 39
Stan. L. Rev. 1453, 1466 (1987).
89 Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C.
sec. 185 (1982).
90 Boys Markets, 90 S. Ct. at 1588 (cited in note 6), quoting Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at
456 (cited in note 8).
9, It is well established that constitutional safeguards apply only to state actions. See,
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); Blum v.
Yaretsky, 102 S. Ct. 2777 (1982). Although the United States Constitution does not expressly establish a right to privacy, a penumbral right, emanating from the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, has been held to exist. See Hurd, Employment Testing at D:13 (cited in note 1), citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). Although constitutional analogies are sometimes used by litigants, the link to the private employment context is weak. See, for example, Venegas v. United Farm Workers Union, 552
P.2d 210 (Wash. App. 1976). At least ten states have constitutional provisions that mention
a right to privacy. Hurd, Employment Testing at D:13. See also, Note, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at
1466 (cited in note 88). Most state provisions, however, are broadly worded and subject to
judicial interpretation. Id. Only in California does the state constitutional provision apply to
private employers. Porten v. University of San Francisco,64 Cal. App.3d 825 (1976).
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stance abuse.92 Yet Lincoln Mills does permit courts to look to
state law for guidance in suits for injunctions against employers,
provided that the state law is compatible with Section 301(a) and
effectuates the federal labor policy. 8 In Boys Markets the Court
found no inconsistency between the Lincoln Mills directive that
federal law be used and the application of common law principles
to Section 301(a) cases: "The congressional purpose embodied in
Section 301(a) was to supplement and not to encroach upon the
pre-existing jurisdiction of the state courts .... Congress clearly
intended to provide additional remedies for breach of collective
bargaining agreements."9 4
State common law traditionally serves as the core of claims
against private actors for invasions of privacy. 5 Thus, courts considering suits by unions for injunctions against employers that institute drug testing plans have at their disposal an expansive body
of law concerning the privacy right. 6 Rather than fashioning the
federal law on individual and disparate concepts of privacy, courts
should anchor the law of injunctions against drug testing programs
on majority principles derived from the aggregate of state common
law.
There are, of course, arguments against using state common
law as a guide in determining whether union members have suffered irreparable harm in the course of drug testing. First, this approach is rather formalistic and, if strictly applied, unduly con92 Hurd, Employment Testing at D:13 (cited in note 1). Federal labor laws impose
on
employers the duty to bargain over conditions of employment; accordingly, failure to bargain constitutes an unfair labor practice. The determination of unfair labor practices is
within the purview of the National Labor Relations Board, which also may seek an injunction against the employer. For an explanation of the duty to bargain over terms of employment, see Meltzer, Labor Law at 838-44 (cited in note 29). Other federal statutes to some
extent affect employer's ability to test employees. It has been argued that the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. sec. 701-796, 1901-06 and 42 U.S.C. sec. 6001-81 (1982 and
Supp. 1985), which applies to private employers, may cover drug addicts as "handicapped"
individuals. The act does not bar testing itself, but only testing that is used to discriminate
against a protected group. Note, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 1469 (cited in note 88). Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 also bars only testing which operates to discriminate against minorities. Id.
93 Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457 (cited in note
8).
9, Boys Markets, 90 S. Ct. at 1589 (cited in note 6) (emphasis added).
95 Hurd, Employment Testing at D:13. The great majority of jurisdictions recognize the
right of privacy. American Law Institute Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 652A at 377
(1977)("Restatement"). As discussed in note 91, ten states recognize the right of privacy in
their constitutions: Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, Washington, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Illinois and Montana. Note, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 1466 (cited in note 88).
91 Restatement sec. 652A et. seq., offers a concise statement of the majority approach to
privacy.
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strains courts of equity. This Comment does not argue, however,
that all courts of equity are constrained by substantive law. Instead, this Comment suggests that the labor context is unique in
that courts must provide remedies not otherwise available at law
and simultaneously adhere to the overriding national labor policy
of promoting the use and uniform enforcement of the arbitration
process. Moreover, this Comment proposes that courts merely use
state common law of privacy as a guide for dispute resolution and
not as a restraint on equitable remedies.
A second argument against the proposed methodology is that
state common law is not useful as it invariably is preempted by
federal labor law. In the event that state law is preempted, denying
the injunction forecloses the union from recovery for some harms
because the arbitrator can only grant compensation provided for
by the collective bargaining agreement. Yet state law is not necessarily preempted. 7 A state claim is preempted only if the state
court, in considering whether the testing program violated the employees' right of privacy, would have to interpret the contract."
A.

Mechanics of the Proposed Approach

Under the commonly accepted approach to tort claims for invasion of privacy,99 an invasion of privacy is caused by: (1) An unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) appropriation of another's name or likeness; (3) unreasonable publicity given
to another's private life, or; (4) publicity that unreasonably places
another in a false light before the public. 100 Clearly, the second
form of intrusion does not apply in the context of employee drug
tests. Also, provided that the employer does not intentionally or
inadvertently publicize 0 1 the results of the tests, the third and

See, for example, Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (defamation
claim under state law permitted in federal damage suit); Farmer v. Carpenters,430 U.S. 290
(1977) (state law damage action for intentional infliction of emotional distress allowed in
federal claim). See also Paul Alan Levy, State Regulation of Drug Testing: Are Organized
Workplaces Exempt?, 1988 U. Chi. Legal F. 141.
"
See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1916 (1985).
" As described in the Restatement sec. 652A (cited in note 95).
m00Restatement sec. 652A(2).
'"1 An employer that publicizes the results of employee tests is subject to tort liability if
"the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public
knowledge." Restatement sec. 652D, comment a (cited in note 95). Intentional publicity can
expose the employer to additional liability for defamation. See W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton, Torts 771-85 (5th ed. 1984). It is assumed for purposes of this Comment
that the employer is not intentionally publicizing the drug test results.
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fourth type of invasion are not relevant. In drug testing cases,
therefore, the most appropriate question is whether the employer's
program constitutes an unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion of
the tested employee.
Generally, the tort of intrusion upon seclusion is committed by
"[olne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon
the solitude or seclusion of another." 10 2 Liability for intrusions extends to employers as well as individuals.' 0° Liability attaches to
the actor whenever the intrusion violates the individual's actual or
circumstantial declaration of a "zone of seclusion"' 0 " and the intrusion is highly offensive to the reasonable person.'0 5
In Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc.,'0 6 a case
involving an employee's suit for an injunction against a private employer for invasion of privacy caused by an employee drug testing
program,' 0 7 the court explicitly held urinalysis testing not to be an
,0, Spencer v. General Tel. Co. of Pennsylvania, 551 F. Supp. 896, 899 (M.D. Pa. 1982),
quoting Restatement sec. 652A(2). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is one of several
jurisdictions which has adopted the Restatement. Id. See also for cases which involve claims
for intrusion upon seclusion and which rely on the Restatement approach McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Verner v. State of Colo., 533 F. Supp. 1109, 1119
(D. Colo. 1982), aff'd 716 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 1983); Birnbaum v. U.S., 436 F. Supp. 967,
976 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Venegas, 552 P.2d 210 (cited in note 91); Werner v. Kliewer, 710 P.2d
1250 (Kan. 1985); Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101 (Md. App. 1986).
"' In Spencer the court concluded that liability for intrusion upon seclusion applies to
employers. Spencer, 551 F. Supp. at 899. The court also explicitly rejected the application of
constitutional protections absent a showing that the employer is a state actor. Id. at 898.
Finally, the fact that Spencer involved a temporary injunction and did not involve labor
statutes does not render the case irrelevant to claims for permanent injunctions against drug
testing. The harm at issue in Spencer is identical to that alleged in testing cases; accordingly, the common law standards applied in Spencer are equivalent to those which should
control the testing cases.
'0' Id. The Restatement defines the "zone of seclusion" to include places in which the
plaintiff has secluded himself (e.g., a room, home), plaintiff's private affairs (e.g., private
phone conversations) and private concerns (e.g., mail, wallet, bank account).
"I0Spencer, 551 F. Supp. at 899. The court in Spencer elucidated the required offensiveness by quoting Comment d, Section 652B, of the Restatement: There is
"no liability unless the interference with the plaintiff's seclusion is a substantial
one ... [and is] the result of conduct to which the reasonable man would strongly
object. Thus there is no liability for knocking at the plaintiff's door, or calling him
on the telephone on one occasion or even two or three, to demand payment of a
debt. It is only when the telephone calls are repeated with such persistence and
frequency as to amount to a course of hounding the plaintiff, that becomes a substantial burden to his existence, that his privacy is invaded."
Id. at 899.
1OO
617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985).
,07 Although Satterfield did not consider suits brought by unions, nothing in the case
prevents the application of its principles to claims for injunctions against employers' drug
testing programs. The harms allegedly caused by drug testing programs are the same regardless of whether the plaintiff is a union or a single employee. In case involving union
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intrusion upon employee seclusion. 0 8 The court concluded that absent a showing by the plaintiff that the testing program represented a "blatant and shocking disregard of his rights" and caused
"serious mental or physical injury or humiliation," the plaintiff's
invasion of privacy claim must fail."0 9
The Satterfield approach, which represents the common view
of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, should be adopted in cases
involving union suits for injunctions against employers. Under this
methodology, the threshold question in these cases is whether the
disputed drug testing invades the employees' zone of seclusion and
highly offends a reasonable person. Thus, the method by which the
test is administered, rather than a court's vague notions of the
right to privacy, becomes the focal point of the analysis.
The Satterfield analysis in the context of drug testing would
go as follows: The court first examines the reach of the employees'
zone of seclusion and whether the employer's method of conducting drug tests oversteps the bounds of the zone. A program
which neither secretly nor forcibly obtains a urine sample most
likely would not violate the employees' zones of seclusion."' The
employee's consent to a request for a urine sample operates to remove the act of surrendering the sample from the zone of seclusion. Admittedly, the employee's consent might be coerced through
threats of loss of employment for noncompliance."' Still, the emclaims, moreover, the harm is measured according to the effect of the drug testing on the
aggregate of individual employees.
108 Id. at 1370.
,09Id., citing Rycroft v. Grady, 314 S.E.2d 39, 43 (S.C. App. 1984).
' A mere request for information does not constitute an invasion. Cort v. Bristol-Meyers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1982). "[Ain action brought by a private sector employee,
alleging that testing is per se a violation of privacy ... is unlikely to be successful because a
private employee is not considered to be under any compulsion to submit to a test even
though refusal may result in discharge." Hurd, Employment Testing at D:22 (cited in note
1). The employer would be more likely to fall within the intended scope of Restatement
Section 652B, as interpreted in Satterfield, if it obtained the urine sample during an annual
physical and did not tell the plaintiff that the sample would .be tested for evidence of drug
use. Another possible source of an invasion is an employer's surreptitious use of the urine
sample to find out information regarding things other than drug use. See, Lance Liebman,
Too Much Information: Predictions of Employee Disease and the Fringe Benefit System,
1988 U. Chi. Legal F. 57. For an example of a non-testing case in which an employer was
liable for an invasion of privacy, see Love v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.,
263 So.2d 460 (La. App. 1972) (employer hired locksmith who forcibly entered the employee's home after employee failed to report to work).
"I In State v. Community Distributors, Inc., 317 A,2d 697 (N.J. 1974), the defendant
was held liable for administering polygraph tests as a condition of continued employment.
This case, however, is different from the drug testing situation because Community Distributors was decided on the basis of a statute which prohibited the use of polygraphs in certain
circumstances. The court relied heavily on the fact that the legislature had disallowed poly-
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ployee can avoid the intrusion by refusing the test, accepting the
12
ensuing discharge and suing for reinstatement and backpay.'
An example of a testing program which arguably would violate
the employee's zone of seclusion is one which forces the employee
to urinate in the presence of a test administrator or monitor. In
such an instance, the employee's reasonable expectation of "private seclusion . . . about his personal affairs" is violated. '
In the second step of the Satterfield analysis, the court examines whether the testing program subjects employees to intrusions
which are substantial enough to highly offend the reasonable person. It appears that, at least in the context of drug testing, this
second step will be subsumed in the first; in other words, the more
flagrant and egregious the violation of the zone of seclusion, the
greater the offense taken by the reasonable person. Thus, in cases
involving tests conducted surreptitiously or tests requiring urination in the presence of a supervisor, it is not unlikely that the reasonable person would be offended."
Absent blatant disregard for the employee's declared or implicit zone of seclusion, a disputed drug testing program will sur'1 5
vive scrutiny under the Satterfield test.
graph tests by balancing the employer's property interests against the employee's privacy
interests. Id. at 700-01. The drug testing cases would be analogous to Community Distributors only if they involved statutes that prohibited testing of employees. Although
polygraphs are often compared to drug tests, there is a notable difference. Polygraph tests
enter into the "personal thoughts, attitudes, and beliefs of the individual subjects." Charles
B. Craver, The Use of Lie Detectors and Surreptitious Surveillance in Private Employment,
San Fernando Valley College of Law Symposium on Labor Law and Industrial Relations 55,
63 (1978). Drug tests are incapable of yielding similar information. Given this difference,
Community Distributorsis not in any way binding on a court considering an injunction to
stop drug testing.
' An aggrieved employee can sue the employer for wrongful discharge; the employee's
union is obligated to represent the employee in the proceedings. For an explanation of the
extent of this duty of representation, see Meltzer, Labor Law at 1127-89 (cited in note 29).
The likelihood of false positives is a factor that should be weighed by the arbitrator in
considering the reasonableness of an employee's discharge. See Elaine W. Shoben, Test Defamation in the Workplace: False Positive Results in Attempting to Detect Lies, AIDS, or
Drug Use, 1988 U. Chi. Legal F. 181, 210-11.
"I Restatement at 15 (cited in note 95).
...In Satterfield, the court emphasized that if the employee is subjectively offended by
the drug test, the test does not amount to an invasion of privacy. 617 F. Supp. at 136 (cited
in note 106).
"' This result is consistent with the court's conclusion in Olin that "[t]he right of privacy of an employee of a private company to be free of testing is not absolute." Olin, slip op.
(cited in note 21). It should be noted, however, that in Olin the union failed to allege that
the testing of employees violated their right of privacy; the union merely objected to the
possible dissemination of test results and the stigma associated with such publicity. Id. The
court, ruling against the injunction, properly focused its attention on the testing itself, because the testing, not the dissemination of data, was being challenged. Indeed, invasion of
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[1988:

Promoting the National Labor Policy

By defining irreparable harm according to the right of privacy
developed in state common law, courts dealing with claims for injunctions against drug testing by employers would effectuate the
national labor policy of promoting and consistently enforcing the
arbitration process." 6 First, the practice of issuing injunctions only
in cases where employee rights to privacy-as defined by the common law of the majority of states-are infringed by a testing program, provides employers with incentives to agree to arbitration.
Given assurances that injunctions will not issue based on any type
of harm to employees, employers will be more likely to submit la17
bor issues to arbitration.

Second, by measuring irreparable harm according to state
common law rights of privacy, courts ultimately will develop a
more cohesive body of federal law regarding employee drug testing,
thus fulfilling the Boys Markets mandate of a uniform federal labor policy." 8 Third, this approach to privacy claims arising from
drug testing policies in the private workplace maintains the separation between the role of the court-enforcing arbitration-and
the role of the arbitrator-interpreting the collective bargaining
agreement." 9 The determination of whether a testing plan intrudes
upon an employee's seclusion and thereby violates his or her right
to privacy is made by the court without resort to the collective bargaining agreement.

privacy suits are more common when the information obtained from testing is publicized.
See, for example, Gravatt v. Columbia University, No. 86 C 1308, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10,
1986) (refusing damages for publication of information); Intern. Union v. Garner, 601 F.
Supp. 187 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (injunction to prohibit release of information by defendant to
plaintiff's employer denied). More often than not, test results become known through no
fault of the employer, but because people observe that the employee was released shortly
after testing began. The harm caused by inadvertent publication should be treated as consequential damages of unemployment, and not as irreparable harm. Otherwise, as noted by
the court in Sun Ship, Inc., an injunction would issue every time a dispute was shown to be
arbitrable. Sun Ship, Inc., 511 F. Supp. at 350 (cited in note 71).
"I Boys Markets, 90 S. Ct. at 1593 (cited in note 6).
.. Employers might otherwise fear that unions will abuse injunctive relief. This does
not imply that unions are more prone than employers to act opportunistically, nor does this
question the validity of the unions' interest in obtaining an injunction. But denying injunctions pending arbitrationis not as likely to deter the union from seeking an arbitration
clause in the bargaining agreement. Unions traditionally have been viewed as the beneficiaries of an agreement by the employer to submit to arbitration. For employers, the agreement to arbitrate a grievance is merely the quid pro quo for unions' promises not to strike.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455 (cited in note 6).
"'
Boys Markets, 90 S. Ct. at 1590 (cited in note 6).
American Mfg. Company, 363 U.S. at 567-68 (cited in note 46).
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Finally, this proposed approach to claims for injunctions
against testing programs does not unduly constrain courts sitting
in equity. This approach merely limits, but does not eliminate, the
circumstances under which employers can be enjoined from testing
employees for drugs to those cases where the usual legal remedy
120
available to employees is inadequate.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although courts sitting in equity should not be constrained by
rigid formulas for determining irreparable harm, it is possible to
maintain a more consistent approach to injunctions in drug testing
cases than exists today. The present inconsistent and seemingly arbitrary decisions undermine the federal policy favoring uniform labor law and the arbitration process. By issuing injunctions against
employee drug testing programs only when employees' privacy
rights, as defined by the common law of a majority of states, have
been violated, courts would effectuate the objectives of the national labor policy. This approach respects employers' freedom to
manage the workplace without compromising employees' rights to
be free from unduly intrusive testing programs.

120 Injunctions operate to "enforce underlying legal rights when the usual legal remedy
of judgment for damages is inadequate." Perritt, Labor Injunctions at 18-19 (cited in note
2).

